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Abstract
We examine the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tari¤s,
welfare and the prospects for free trade when the nonmember rm has an incentive to
engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First we show that upon the formation of a
bilateral CU, the non-member rm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However,
when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the nonmember rm under a CU, member
countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint
external tari¤. When xed set-up cost of FDI is su¢ ciently low, this tari¤ falls below
Kemp-Wan tari¤ and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement.
Moreover, using an innite repetition of the one-shot tari¤ game under a CU, we show
that FDI incentive of the nonmember rm makes the member countries (nonmember
country) more (less) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has been
the visible trend in the international trading system. Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) permits member countries of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to form preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as free trade agreements (FTAs)
and customs unions (CUs) under which PTA members can grant tari¤ reductions to each
other that they do not extend to other WTO members. As per the WTOs o¢ cial web-site,
by December 2008, the WTO had received notication of 421 such arrangements, of which
324 were notied under Article XXIV.1 While FTAs constitute an overwhelming majority
of PTAs, the existing CUs involve some of the major economies of the world: for example,
the Latin American CU MERCOSUR counts Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
as its members while the EC (27) a CU that extends across both goods and services 
comprises of most major European economies. As a result, it is important to obtain a better
understanding of the factors that give rise to CUs and the e¤ect CUs have on the multilateral
trading system.
Ever since Jacob Viner (1950)s classic analysis, the static distortions created by such pref-
erential trade liberalization have received signicant attention from economists and policy-
makers alike. Furthermore, in recent years there has been widespread concern regarding
the potential adverse e¤ects of PTAs on the process of multilateral trade liberalization (the
raison detre of the World Trade Organization (WTO)).
Concurrent with the proliferation of PTAs, world economy has also witnessed the largest
ever FDI growth both in developing and developed countries. New patterns of globaliza-
tion have accelerated the internationalization of industries and reshaping of global industrial
structure. While PTAs induce signicant changes in the patterns of trade and investment,
1About 230 such agreements were already in force by December 2008 with the number expected to reach
400 by 2010. Mongolia is the only WTO member that does not participate in any PTA and most WTO
members belong to multiple PTAs. Indeed, one even observes major PTAs in discussion with each other
regarding mutual liberalization.
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the existing literature on PTAs has treated export as the only mode of entry and mostly
overlooked the role of foreign direct investment (FDI). PTAs, by eliminating tari¤s among
members, lead to an expanded market and thus increase the incentives of nonmember coun-
triesrms to penetrate into the integrated area via FDI by building a plant in one of the
member countries and producing output that will be sold in all member countriesmarkets.2
Based upon this observation, the present paper examines the case where the formation of
a customs union (CU) gives a nonmember rm an incentive to engage in FDI in member
countriesmarkets while this incentive does not exist under no agreement.3
What are the implications of a CU on the pattern of tari¤s, welfare, and the prospects
for global free trade when a nonmember rm has an option to engage in FDI? Under re-
peated interaction, how does the FDI option a¤ect incentives of member and non-member
countries for multilateral cooperation over free trade? To address these questions, we utilize
an oligopoly model of intra-industry trade between three countries. In our model, we focus
on the scenario where countries are completely symmetric both from e¢ ciency and market
size perspectives. Consistent with this scenario, we assume that there exists no externalities
arising from FDI both for the host and the source countries. In other words, consistent with
the literature, rms typically face a trade-o¤ between the xed cost of an additional plant
in the export market and the benet of economizing on tari¤s and trade costs.4
We rst derive the Nash equilibrium of a one-shot game with and without FDI option
under no agreement and a bilateral CU. When two countries form a customs union, they
eliminate tari¤s on each other, and impose a lower tari¤ on the non-member rm. This
external tari¤ e¤ect is called as the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997).
Even though the tari¤ is lower, the non-member rm earns lower prot from its exports,
2Donnenfeld (2003) has highlighted the role of FDI incentives in determining the consequences of regional
bloc formation on interbloc and intrabloc trade.
3Jaumotte (2004) found a positive impact of PTAs on the FDI received by member countries, even more
so in the 1990s when such agreements were revived.
4Markusen (1995) surveyed the theoretical literature on FDI and multinational enterprises (MNE). This
literature includes papers by Dunning (1977), Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Markusen and Venables
(1998).
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because the member rms expand their output in each othersmarkets. It follows that the
non-member rm has greater incentives to engage in FDI following the formation of CU. We
show that, when there exists no externalities attached to FDI activities, member countries
have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tari¤
if FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the nonmember rm under a CU. When xed
set-up cost of FDI is su¢ ciently low, this tari¤ falls below Kemp-Wan tari¤ (1976) and CU
leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement.
Then, we examine the innite repetition of the above one-shot game under a bilateral
CU and examine the incentives of countries to multilaterally cooperate over free trade.
Multilateral tari¤cooperation over free trade is modeled as a stationary repeated game where
cooperation can be sustained only if it is incentive compatible for all countries.5 In these
models, cooperation is self-enforcing in the sense that each country balances the current
benet of deviating from free trade against the future losses caused by the breakdown of
multilateral cooperation that results from its defection. We show that when the nonmember
rm has no FDI incentives, member countries are less willing to cooperate multilaterally
over free trade than the nonmember country so that the non-member countrys incentive
is binding for the multilateral cooperation over free trade. On the other hand, when the
non-member countrys rm has an incentive to engage in FDI and multilateral cooperation
breaks down, member countries internalize the potential FDI threat and lower their external
tari¤s on nonmembers export forever (while the nonmember country switches to its MFN.
Therefore, the cost of defection to the nonmember country falls whereas it rises for member
countries and thus the nonmember country (member countries) has (have) stronger (weaker)
incentive to defect from cooperation since CUs external tari¤ gets lower. As a result, we
argue that the non-member rms FDI incentives make the member countries (nonmember
country) more (less) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade.
5See Bagwell and Staiger (1997 and 1998), Bond et. al. (2001), and Saggi (2006).
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2 Basic Model
We develop an oligopoly model of trade with three symmetric countries: z = i, j, k and two
goods: x and y. Good x is produced by a single prot-maximizing rm in each country at a
constant marginal cost c in terms of the numeraire good y. Preferences over the two goods
are quasilinear:
Ui(xi; yi) = u(xi) + yi (1)
Furthermore, u(xi) is assumed to be quadratic so that the demand curve for good x is linear
in each country:
pi(xi) =  
X
z
xzi (2)
where xzi denotes the output sold by country zs rm in country i while xi is the total output
sold in country i: xi 
X
z
xzi.
We examine a three-stage game under two trade regimes: no agreement hfgi and a
bilateral customs union hfijgi. In the rst stage, countries simultaneously choose their
optimum tari¤s. Then, rms decide whether to serve foreign markets via export or FDI.
Finally, rms compete in Cournot fashion. We obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) by backward induction.
2.1 No Agreement hfgi
We use an indicator function to di¤erentiate the export and FDI equilibrium:
If =

1 if a rm makes FDI
0 if a rm exports
In the export equilibrium (If = 0), we restrict our attention to symmetric tari¤s based on
Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause where ti denotes the tari¤ imposed by country i. By
contrast, when a rm makes FDI (If = 1), it avoids bearing tari¤ costs but has to pay an
exogenous plant-level xed cost F in each of the two countries. Firm is e¤ective marginal
cost in country j equals:
cij = c+ tj[1  If ], for all i 6= j (3)
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Then, prot of rm i in country js market can be written as:
ij = xijpj(xj)  cijxij   IfF , for all i 6= j (4)
First order conditions (FOCs) for prot maximization are
pj + p
0
jxij = cij, for all i 6= j (5)
The above FOCs together with an analogous condition for the local rm can be easily solved
for equilibrium output levels and prots:
ii = x
2
ii, ij = x
2
ij   IfF , for all i 6= j (6)
Welfare of country i is dened as the sum of its domestic surplus and total export prots:
Wi  Si +
X
j 6=i
ij (7)
where
Si  u(xi)  pixi + ii + ti[1  If ]
X
j 6=i
xji (8)
In the export equilibrium (If = 0), since markets are segmented, strategic independence of
trade policies obtains. Thus, country is tari¤ choice problem reduces to:
max
ti
Si  u(xi)  pixi + ii + ti
X
j 6=i
xji (9)
The optimal tari¤ is given by
ti =
3(  c)
10
(10)
Foreign prots under export and FDI equilibria are found as follows:
ij(If = 0) =

  c
10
2
and ij(If = 1) =

  c
4
2
  F (11)
Then, a rm prefers FDI over export under hfgi when F falls below F :
ij(If = 1)  ij(If = 0) i¤ F  F  = 21

  c
20
2
(12)
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2.2 Customs Union (CU) hfijgi
In the export equilibrium (If = 0) under CU hfijgi, member countries (i and j) impose
a common external tari¤ tu on the nonmember while simultaneously eliminating tari¤s on
each other. Due to symmetry and market segmentation, member countries solve
max
tu
Si(tu) + ji(tu) (13)
and the optimal tari¤ is:
tu =
5(  c)
19
(14)
When countries form a CU, member countriesexport increases while that of non-member
countries decreases. Thus, compared to hfgi, CU membersincentives to impose a tari¤ on
the non-member decrease since it becomes less important source for rent-extraction: tu < t

i .
In other words, tari¤ complementarity e¤ect obtains (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1997).
In contrast to hfgi, nonmember rm (k) can engage in FDI under hfijgi by building
only one plant within the borders of CU and servicing the entire market freely with the
goods produced in this plant. Let uk and 
u f
k denote the total prots of k under hfijgi in
export and FDI equilibria respectively:
uk = 
u
ki + 
u
kj = 2

  c
19
2
and u fk = 
u f
ki + 
u f
kj = 2

  c
4
2
  F (15)
As a result,
u fk  uk i¤ F  F
u
=
345
2

  c
38
2
(16)
Proposition 1: Critical xed set-up cost is higher under hfijgi than under hfgi:
F
u
> F

.
The above proposition indicates that the emergence of a CU increases the incentives of
nonmember rms to serve the bloc via FDI. Note that this occurs even when member coun-
tries lower external tari¤s (tu < t

i ), so that the increase in FDI incentives is not necessarily
due to tari¤ jumping.
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3 Welfare Implications of a CU
In exploring the welfare implications of a CU, we examine two distinct cases.
3.1 No FDI Incentives: F  F u
When F  F u holds, rms prefer export to FDI under both hfijgi and hfgi. Let W uz and
W z denote the welfare of country z under hfijgi and hfgi. It is easy to show that countries
always have an incentive to form a CU:
W ui  W i =
71
19

  c
10
2
> 0 (17)
while nonmember country (k) is worse o¤:
W uk  W k =  
29
2

3(  c)
95
2
< 0 (18)
Thus, when export is the only feasible mode of entry, the formation of a CU makes multilat-
eral free trade less (more) desirable to member (nonmember) countries in a static framework.
3.2 FDI Incentives under a CU: F
u
> F  F 
When F
u
> F  F  holds, the nonmember rm (k) is tempted to evade tari¤s via FDI
under hfijgi while it still prefers export to FDI under hfgi. So far, we have assumed
that member countriesoptimal tari¤s are not a¤ected by the nonmember rms incentive
to engage in FDI. However, by selecting appropriate tari¤s, member countries can inuence
the equilibrium mode of entry to their markets. To this end, we distinguish between the
standard optimal tari¤ tu levied by member countries under hfijgi where only export is
considered and tfu where the FDI incentives exist. The latter optimal tari¤, t
f
u, internalizes
the potential threat FDI exposes and is set just below the critical tari¤ level that prevents
FDI by a nonmember rm:
uk(t
f
u)  u fk i¤ tu  tfu =
(  c) p(  c)2   8F
3
(19)
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where
@tfu
@F
=
4
3
p
(  c)2   8F > 0 and t
f
u  tu (20)
Intuitively, when F gets smaller, FDI incentives become stronger and thus optimal tari¤ of a
CU should be lowered in order to induce export over FDI. The latter part of (20) argues that
the nonmember rms FDI threat limits the e¤ectiveness of CUs ability in levying tari¤s
and thus has a trade liberalization e¤ect.
Is it optimal for member countries to induce export over FDI? Relative to the case where
FDI is accommodated, tfu enables members to raise their prots and capture tari¤ revenue.
These two e¤ects are found to dominate the harmful impact of tari¤s on consumerssurplus:
W ui (t
f
u) W ui (If = 1) =
(  c)
hp
(  c)2   8F   (  c)
i
+ 19F
36
> 0 (21)
Proposition 2: When F
u
> F  F  holds, (i) it is optimal for CU members to
induce the nonmember rm to engage in export (rather than FDI); (ii) CU leads to Pareto
improvement if F  2F  where F u > 2F   F .
Note that even when they are limited in imposing their optimal tari¤s, member countries
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benet from exchanging preferential access in each others market:
W ui (t
f
u) W i =
200
h
(  c)p(  c)2   8F + 19Fi  227(  c)2
7200
> 0 (22)
Moreover, when F = 2F

holds, CUs external tari¤equals Kemp-Wan tari¤ (1976), denoted
by tKW , at which a CU improves the welfare of its members relative to hfgi without making
the nonmember country worse o¤:
tfu = t
KW =
(  c)
5
i¤ F = 2F

=
21
2

  c
10
2
(23)
As gure 1 indicates, since @t
f
u
@F
> 0, the welfare implications of a CU on the nonmember
country get reversed and CU leads to a Pareto improvement when F falls below 2F

:
W uk (t
f
u) W k =
21
2

  c
10
2
  F  0 i¤ 2F   F  F  (24)
4 Multilateral Cooperation under a CU
Next, we analyze the innite repetition of the above one-shot tari¤ game under CU and
examine the incentives of countries to multilaterally cooperate over free trade. Similar to the
existing literature, multilateral tari¤ cooperation over free trade is modeled as a stationary
repeated game where cooperation can be sustained only if it is incentive compatible for
all countries. In these models, cooperation is self-enforcing in the sense that each country
balances the current benet of deviating from free trade against the future losses caused by
the breakdown of multilateral cooperation that results from its defection. Countries sustain
cooperation via trigger strategies so that defection by any country results in a permanent
trade war wherein all countries revert to their initial tari¤s. Similar to Saggi (2006), we
assume that CU is permanent by nature so that members retain zero tari¤s on each other
even if cooperation breaks down.
To tie our results with the existing literature, next we examine the case where there exists
no FDI incentives.
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4.1 No FDI Incentives: F  F u
Suppose each country employs a zero tari¤ until someone defects, in which case cooperation
breaks down with the nonmember country switching to its MFN tari¤ tk forever while mem-
ber countries impose tu on nonmembers export. Hereafter, let m denote member countries:
m = i; j.
Defection from free trade benets the defecting nonmember country by increasing its
domestic surplus via the ability to impose optimal tari¤ tk . Thus, one period benet from
defection for a nonmember country equals
Bk(ij) =Wk(tk = t

k ; tm = 0) Wk(tz = 0) =
1
10

3(  c)
4
2
> 0 (25)
On the other hand, defection by member countries leads to an increase in domestic surplus
as well as in export prots:
Bm(ij) =Wm(tk = 0; tm = t

u) Wm(tz = 0) =
1
38

5(  c)
4
2
> 0 (26)
This implies that under symmetry, if countries were to completely discount the future payo¤s,
the multilateral tari¤ cooperation would not be feasible.
Now consider the per period cost of the breakdown of cooperation:
Ck(ij) = Wk(tz = 0) W uk =
3651
10

  c
76
2
> 0 (27)
Cm(ij) = Wm(tz = 0) W um =
173
38

  c
20
2
> 0 (28)
In order for tari¤ cooperation to be self-enforcing, the one period benet from defection must
be less than the discounted life-time cost of defection since defection leads to permanent
multilateral trade war. In other words, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must
hold for each country as follows:
Bz(ij)  
1  Cz(ij) (29)
where  denotes the discount factor and 
1 Cz(ij) measures the trade wars life-time cost of
defection to each country under a CU. For each country, the critical discount factor z above
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which cooperation over free trade is self-enforcing obtains when Bz(ij)  1 Cz(ij) holds:
m =
625
798
= 0:78 > k = 1083
2300
= 0:47 (30)
Proposition 3: When F  F u holds, m > k obtains. Thus, multilateral cooperation
over free trade is sustainable if and only if   m.
The above proposition suggests that when the nonmember rm has no FDI incentives,
member countries are less willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade relative to the
non-member country so that the member countrys choice determines whether multilateral
cooperation over free trade is sustainable.
4.2 FDI Incentives: F
u
> F  F 
Let Bfz (ij) and C
f
z (ij) denote the per period benet and cost of defection when the non-
member rm has FDI incentives. It is important to note that members still impose the
unrestricted tari¤ (tu = tu) in the defection period. Thus, benets from defection stay the
same as in (25) and (26):
Bfz (ij) = Bz(ij) for all z = i; j; k (31)
Once multilateral cooperation breaks down, member countries internalize the potential FDI
threat and lower their external tari¤s on nonmembers export forever (tfu  tu) while the
nonmember country switches to its MFN tari¤ tk . Therefore, the cost of defection to the
nonmember country falls whereas it rises for member countries:
Cfk (ij)  Ck(ij) while Cfm(ij)  Cm(ij) (32)
The following is immediate from (31) and (32):
Proposition 4: FDI incentive of the nonmember rm makes the member countries
(nonmember country) more (less) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade: fk  k
and fm  m.
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We know from (30) that
fm = m > 
f
k = k when F = F
u
(33)
As represented by gure 2, when F gets lower, the nonmember country (member countries)
has (have) stronger (weaker) incentive to defect from cooperation since CUs external tari¤
gets lower (@t
f
u
@F
> 0):
@fk
@F
< 0,
@fm
@F
> 0 (34)
In other words, nonmember country has an incentive to free ride on trade liberalization
undertaken by CU members without having to liberalize in return.
When we evaluate fk and 
f
m at F = F

:
fk > 
f
mjF=F (35)
Given inequalities (33), (34) and (35), there must exist a critical threshold F below which
fk  fm holds and thus nonmember countrys choice becomes binding for the sustainability
of cooperation:
fk > 
f
m i¤ F  F where F
u
> F  F  (36)
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Finally, since @m
@F
= 0 and fk > mjF=F, it is immediate to argue that 
f
k > m obtains
when F < F holds. Therefore, the nonmember rms FDI incentive makes multilateral
cooperation over free trade harder to sustain when F is su¢ ciently low : F < F .
5 Conclusion
Ever since Jacob Viner (1950) rst drew attention to the issue, the economics of prefer-
ential trade agreements such as Customs Unions (CUs) has received intense scrutiny from
economists and policy-makers alike. While PTAs induce signicant changes in the patterns
of trade and investment, the existing literature on PTAs has treated export as the only
mode of entry and mostly overlooked the role of foreign direct investment (FDI). CUs, by
eliminating tari¤s among members, increase the incentives of nonmember countriesrms to
penetrate into the expanded market (integrated area) via FDI.
Given the recent proliferation of PTAs and the large growth in FDI activities, it is
important to understand the static and dynamic implications of PTAs on the trading system
when FDI is an alternative mode of entry to export. To this end, we present a model where
the formation of a CU gives the nonmember rm an incentive to engage in FDI while this
incentive does not exist under no agreement. Under such a case, we show that CU members
have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tari¤s.
When xed set-up cost of FDI is su¢ ciently low, this tari¤falls below Kemp-Wan tari¤(1976)
and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. This is an important result
since non-member country is always worse-o¤ under a bilateral CU when export is the only
mode of entry in serving foreign markets.
Then, using a game of repeated interaction, we examine how the FDI option a¤ects the
incentives of member and non-member countries for multilateral cooperation over free trade.
We nd that, when FDI option is available, the nonmember country (member countries) has
(have) stronger (weaker) incentive to defect from cooperation due to lower external tari¤s of
a CU. This implies that the non-member rms FDI incentives make the member countries
14
(nonmember country) more (less) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade.
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